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The  U.S.  agricultural  economy has become a trade driven  system.
Exports have become crucial  in determining  commodity prices for those
commodities  which  use a high proportion  of our  cropland,  and these
commodity  prices  in  turn  are  a  major  determinant  of livestock  and
poultry output and prices. All of this is well understood by agricultural
economists,  by most farmers, and by most policy makers.  Our current
domestic  farm  policy  accepted  this  fact  and  then made  certain  as-
sumptions about the export market  and its future behavior.
Those  assumptions  led  us  to construct  a  certain  kind of domestic
farm policy, which worked reasonably well over the decade  of the 1970s.
There  is  a serious question,  however,  as to whether the assumptions
are  valid for  the 1980s  and  beyond.  I want to examine this question
and then to discuss  briefly what we  can  do  if our  assumptions  were
wrong.
The  basic and most important  assumption  was that world demand
for  imports  of U.S.  farm  products  would  expand  rapidly  enough  to
absorb  the  growth  in  U.S.  production  and  that  of other  competing
exporters at prices which would provide reasonable returns to the own-
ers of resources employed in the system. In economists' jargon we would
have "market equilibrium",  and there  would be no  need for the  con-
troversial and expensive  domestic farm programs  which had been the
norm in U.S. policy for the entire period since World War II. Of course,
it  was  recognized that there would be fluctuations  in export demand
from year to year, primarily  because of weather.
In  order  to undergird  the system,  a rather  simple  system  of price
supports,  target prices, and a farmer-owned  reserve  was established.
The price supports were to be set at market-clearing levels, thus avoid-
ing government stock accumulations and undue enhancement of world
market prices.  The target prices  were  to be  set to  cover  the variable
costs of production  and to thus protect farmers' incomes in those rare
years in which the market demand was not adequate. The reserve was
to accumulate  stocks in those years in which either our own supplies
were unusually large or foreign import demand fell off because of un-
usually good weather.  Stocks were to move out of the reserve in years
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because of bad weather.
This  is  the system  that was  put  into  place  in the  1973  and  1977
Agricultural  Acts and continued in the  1981 version.  The underlying
assumptions  about export  demand led  directly to  assumptions  about
how these programs would work. First, it was assumed that the price
support  and target price  payments would  rarely come  into play, and
therefore,  government  intervention  would be rare and program costs
relatively  low.  Second, it  was assumed  that the reserve  would  stock
and  destock on a regular basis and, thus, that reserve  size  would not
continue  to grow  and add another  major item to program  costs. And
third,  it was assumed  that our price support  level would not become
a significant factor in world market prices nor become a factor in our
ability to export.
These assumptions were not confined to a few economists within the
USDA  or elsewhere.  They were shared,  not only by those who  made
agricultural  policy,  but  also by those  who  made  agricultural  - and
agriculturally-related  - investments.  This includes those who invest
in  port  elevators,  hopper  cars,  and barges,  those  who  manufacture
farm  machinery,  and those who make  fertilizer,  herbicides,  and pes-
ticides.  Hundreds  of billions  of dollars were  invested  by the private
sector in the United States and elsewhere around the world using the
same assumptions. Many of the same assumptions were implicit in the
Common Agricultural  Policy of the European  Common Market.
These assumptions seemed to hold for the decade of the 1970s. Farm
exports grew  every year at a healthy pace, farmers had the best real
and nominal income in their lifetime, and agribusiness prospered.  Farm
program  costs fell and government  intervention in the market for ag-
ricultural  products was sharply  reduced. Then, suddenly in 1981, things
started to go wrong!  Export sales began to falter, then to decline.  Stocks
of farm products began to accumulate in government programs and in
the reserve.  Target price payments became  necessary  and large.  Ex-
penditures  for farm programs began to mount to the point that they
have  become  a significant  item in a worrisome  budget  deficit and  a
significant fraction of net income  from farming.
In a desperation  move the administration developed  the Payment-
in-Kind (PIK) program  which will be the costliest farm program ever
run and which promises to give farm programs a bad name for decades
to come.  Meanwhile,  exports are  down sharply again in  1982/83  and
are projected  to fall even further in  1983/84. Public attention is being
drawn to farm programs,  and many  are already saying that our pro-
gram direction  will have to  change when the farm bill is  considered
in 1985.
All indications  are that something  is drastically  wrong  in our  as-
sumptions about foreign markets and foreign trade. At present we are
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most extensive  and expensive  land retirement program  in history.  This
temporary improvement  in commodity prices may lead some people to
believe things are all right, but I do not think that is the case, and by
this time next year I think it will be obvious to all  once again.  Let us
look,  then,  at our international  markets  to see  how our  assumptions
appear for the years ahead.
The Market  Growth Problem
Our assumptions  have  been  that foreign  markets  for agricultural
products  would grow at a healthy rate for the foreseeable  future. This
has been  the case  for a number  of years  and everyone  assumed that
it would  continue.  For instance,  world  wheat  use  increased  in  18  of
the  last 22  years  until  1981/82,  when  it fell  for  the first time  since
1973/74, which was a period of world shortage and high prices. World
coarse grain  consumption  increased  in  17  of the  past 22  years  (with
declines only in 1963/64  and in 1974/75 when poor Soviet and/or U.S.
crops cut use)  until we  hit the three consecutive  years  starting with
1979/80  in which use declined.
As a result of this growth in use,  world trade in wheat expanded  in
12  of the last 15 years and trade in coarse grain expanded in 16 of the
last 22  years.  World  coarse  grain trade  increased  in  every  year but
one  from  1968/69  to  1981/82.  It has now  declined  for  two years  in  a
row and the modest recovery now projected for next year would leave
it at about the  1977/78  level.  A similar story can be found for each of
the major agricultural commodities  moving in world trade.
During the period  of rapid growth in world trade in farm products,
two  groups  of countries  accounted  for  all  of the  growth in  imports.
These were the middle-income developing countries and the centrally-
planned economies of the USSR, China, and Eastern Europe. Japanese
imports grew slowly, and Western European imports actually declined
as local  output expanded more  rapidly than market  demand. During
the final  years  of the  decade  the  import  demand  of the  newly  rich
OPEC  countries grew especially  rapidly.  As late as the fall of 1980  a
careful analysis by the USDA suggested that demand for U.S. exports
would continue  to grow at healthy rates  for at least another decade.
Underlying  this growth in  import  demand was the  very  good  eco-
nomic  growth that the centrally-planned  economies  and  the middle-
income developing countries had enjoyed during the 1960s and on into
the 1970s.  Of course,  many  of the developing  countries  had suffered
severe balance of payments problems as a result of the "oil shocks"  of
1973 and 1979, but these were easily financed by the highly profitable
recycling  of the  OPEC  surpluses  by  the world's  commercial  banks.
Thus,  the  debts  accumulated  as  a  result  of  foreign  loans  in  plant,
equipment,  and  infrastructure  as  a  part of the normal  development
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items of current consumption.  Suddenly,  in  1980 the realities of the
situation began to catch up  with the world,  and  we have  found  our-
selves facing the most serious debt crisis since the  1930s.
The initial culprit was the worldwide  economic downturn led by the
U.S.  and Western  Europe as  a result of the corrective monetary poli-
cies applied to stop the spiraling inflation set off by the second oil price
increase.  Two things happened at once.
One was that the market for commodities and manufactured  goods,
which the developing countries depend upon to earn foreign exchange,
turned  soft. Second,  U.S. and world interest rates rose to record highs
in both nominal and real terms,  and since much of the world's debt is
tied to floating  rates,  higher interest rate payments were  added to  a
deteriorating  balance  of payments.  Poland  was  the first  country  to
announce  that  it could  not pay its debts  or even  the  interest  on its
debts in 1980.
Since then the number of countries joining the list is so long that it
is easier to list those which are solvent than those which are not. The
problem  list now includes  virtually  every country  in Latin America,
all  of Eastern  Europe  except  the  Soviet  Union,  and  key  importing
countries in Asia and Africa.
The damper on foreign market growth that results from an economic
slowdown creates a serious  problem, but that problem  is made much
worse  by  the  debt  situation  and the  balance  of payments  squeeze.
Recessions  come  and go,  and this  one  has hit most of the countries
worse than anytime since  the  1930s,  but the major question is will a
worldwide recovery  lead to the resumption  of growth rates like those
of the  good years?
Many informed people think that unless extraordinary action is taken
to deal with the debt problem,  future growth  will be  slower.  Future
growth depends  in part  on additional long-term  loans to finance  pro-
ductive investment.
Now, and for the foreseeable  future,  it is likely to be hard to find a
commercial banker who wants to make loans to either public or private
entities in those problem countries. And as our Congress is indicating,
there is no great enthusiasm  to rush in with large amounts of public
loans. Thus, the odds appear very high that our underlying optimistic
assumptions about foreign economic growth rates will not be realized.
The Trade Problem
Another  problem  has arisen  which  was not anticipated  in our  as-
sumptions regarding the growth in agricultural exports. Over the last
three  years the U.S.  has become  the residual  supplier  in the  world
markets for our key agricultural exports. We have been losing market
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sion, debt,  and balance  of payments problems.  There are several  rea-
sons for this, and the impact has been different in different markets.
A major reason for our loss of market position has been the strength
of the dollar against other major currencies.  After a long and steady
decline  in  the value  of the dollar from  1973  to mid-1980,  the  dollar
started to strengthen  and has continued  to  do so through  1983. This
has the effect of making our products more expensive to foreign buyers,
and it makes  it possible  for our  competitors  to  undersell  us without
cutting prices to their own producers  in their own currencies.
The  effects  of the stronger dollar can  clearly be seen  by comparing
the situation in August  1980 and in the second week of August  1983.
In those two periods the farm price of wheat in the U.S. was $3.34 and
$3.33  per  bushel,  respectively.  However,  because  of exchange  rate
changes  the price  in  German marks  was DM  5.97  and  DM  9.11.  In
French francs the 1980 price was FF 13.9, and the  1983 price was FF
27.4. In Japanese  yen the comparable figures are y 749.6 and y 821.5.
Thus,  even though  our producers  were getting the same  price in the
two years our foreign buyers were paying substantially more. It is not
surprising that they are buying elsewhere  when they can and holding
their purchases  to a minimum.
The  other  effect  of the strong  dollar  is the protection  and encour-
agement it gives to our competitors.  Let us look at these same figures
in that context. In August  1980 our wheat price translated into $2.89
Australian,  in August 1983 our wheat price translated into $3.82 Aus-
tralian.  In  other words the change  in the exchange  rates  will  allow
the Australian farmer to receive almost $1  a bushel more for his wheat
while  our  producers  get  the  same.  Or  conversely,  Australian  wheat
can undersell ours in the world market by a little bit and still have it
return  more than it did three years ago. It is not surprising  to learn
that Australia  is likely to produce  and export  the largest quantity  of
wheat ever!
There  are several reasons for the strength of the dollar.  One is that
capital is  flowing from other countries  to the U.S. because it appears
safer here. This is a common occurrence  during times of financial  and
political instability.  However, the major reason for the strength of the
dollar  is  the large  capital  flows brought  on by the  immense  federal
deficit.  The large federal deficit requires that the federal government
borrow large  quantities  of money in the money  markets. In order to
attract sufficient funds from at home and abroad the government has
to pay high interest rates and these high rates encourage large capital
inflows  which cause  a strong dollar.
Another reason  for the capital flows is the foreign investments that
foreign firms are making in the U.S. to avoid the ever-increasing  threat
of U.S.  import  barriers.  Ironically,  much of the  pressure  for  import
barriers  comes from the crippling  effect that the strong dollar has on
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escaping the fact that  most of the strength of the dollar  is the result
of our own unfortunate  fiscal policy.
It would be foolhardy to predict that the dollar will continue  at this
level  relative  to other currencies  for the indefinite  future.  However,
at this point there is no  evidence of the political will necessary  to get
our fiscal house in order and, thus, this drag on our exports  may con-
tinue for  some time.
Another reason for our weakened competitive position is our image
as  an  unreliable  supplier.  Each  of the  last  four  presidents  has  re-
stricted exports,  either for short supply  or foreign  policy reasons.  The
most famous and well remembered  of these is the Russian grain em-
bargo of 1980 which was  imposed by President  Carter in response  to
the Russian  invasion  of Afghanistan.  Each President  has promised
that they would not do something like that and each time the Congress
has  added  penalties  for  doing  it,  but  foreign  buyers  are  somewhat
skeptical  of these disavowals  and probably  rightfully so.  As a result
foreign buyers  diversify their sources  of supply  of farm products  and
reduce our market share.
Another  factor  which  adversely  affects  our  export  position  is  our
foreign policy.  By and large we  do not let our foreign  policy  position
stop us from exporting  to a country,  because our exports are done by
the private trade, and they will sell to  any country  unless such  sales
are  specifically  forbidden  by law  or executive  order. This  separation
of foreign  policy and trade is not so sharp on the importing side, how-
ever.  In most countries importing  is either done  directly by the  gov-
ernment  or  is closely  controlled by  the  government.  Thus,  while  we
may say that we will sell grain to the Russians  even though we don't
like them, the Russians  tend to reward their friends by buying  from
them while ignoring those they aren't getting along with.
This attitude  has certainly  been a factor in their limited purchases
of the last two years and is likely to continue to be a factor as long as
tensions between our countries are high. The Chinese announced last
spring that they were limiting their purchases from us, because they
didn't like our textile import policy. Other countries do the same thing,
but they usually are less obvious about it and the impact is less visible.
This sitution  is likely to  continue  for the  indefinite  future.  A  great
power  like  the United  States  cannot  let its  foreign  policy  be  deter-
mined by any narrow economic  interests, and, thus,  we can expect to
have some  of our export  interests  come  into conflict with our foreign
policy from time to time.
Changes  in Competition
All of these factors - the strong dollar, the unreliable supplier label,
and foreign policy - would be much less of a problem if the nature of
our competition  had  not changed  over the last five years.  When  the
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rapidly by merely returning to use land which had been idled by farm
programs.  Moreover,  the  great flexibility  which  marks  our  agricul-
tural system  made  it possible for  us to  respond  quickly.  As a result
the U.S.  got the lion's  share  of the expanded  export  market through
most of the 1970s.
In the late  1970s however, both area harvested and yield for wheat
and  coarse grains in Canada  expanded.  As a result, Canadian  wheat
exports rose by 50 percent from 1972/73 to 1982/83,  and barley exports
rose  even  faster.  In  Australia  both acreage  and  yield  also  rose,  and
Australian  exports  rose  at  the  same  time.  In  Argentina  land  area
didn't change  so much,  but yields  rose very sharply and  exports rose
accordingly.  Those  three major  competitors  doubled  their exports  of
wheat from  1973/74  to  1983/84!
Matters  have been made worse by the change  in the Common Mar-
ket's position  from a  large net importer  of grain  at the beginning  of
the  1970s to a significant  net exporter  of grain beginning in  1980/81.
This is especially  important for wheat where  the EC is now the third
largest net exporter following the U.S. and Canada.  This situation was
the  result of sharp  rises  in yields  in  Europe,  not  as  a  result of ex-
panding land area.
Much,  probably  too much,  has been made of the effect that the Eu-
ropean Agricultural Policy  has had on  expanding grain output in the
Community.  And there is no  question that they could not export  with
their high internal price  level without  export subsidies.  But,  even if
all that is true, the fact is that the EC is now a surplus grain producer
and  is  likely  to continue  to  be  under  any  policy that  appears  to  be
politically  achievable  in the  foreseeable  future.  Unfortunately,  their
surplus production  also extends to meat, chickens,  and a host of other
products  - and our increased  competition  is not limited to these  few
countries. Brazil has expanded output of soybeans and chickens, Thai-
land of rice and corn, and the list is growing  longer each year.
Both the U.S. and a number of countries have responded to the rise
in  agricultural  commodity  prices  which occurred  in the last decade.
As it happened,  the U.S. reponse  was quickest, but now we face com-
petition for export markets far beyond what we imagined or projected
when we were making our estimates of export potential which under-
gird our farm policy.  Now this competitive export  capacity exists and
may be almost  impossible to drive out of business.
Where  Do We  Go  From Here?
For  a series of reasons which I have tried to outline it appears that
the basic  assumptions  about  exports  which  formed the basis for  our
domestic  farm programs clearly  are wrong now and may remain that
way for some years to come. There is a natural tendency in our political
system  to  avoid  change,  especially  those  changes  which  cause  eco-
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possible  in this case,  however,  because to do that results  in a worse
situation and more pain and losses. It is important, therefore,  to start
thinking  now  about what  alternatives  are  available  and what they
would mean.
The  first inclination  is  to  say  that if something  is  wrong  in  the
international markets we should fix things there. Unfortunately, that
will  be  easier  said than  done.  The problems  I  have  outlined in that
area are  only partly  under our  control  at best.  We  can take  action
which  will help  economic recovery  abroad and  assist in the debt  and
balance  of payments problems,  but such actions will not be very pop-
ular politically  and their  success will be dependent  upon other coun-
tries' actions as well as ours. Certainly, if such actions are taken, they
will  not be  taken  in  the  name  of farm  exports,  but  in  the  general
national  interest.
If fixing the international  markets turns out to be beyond our eco-
nomic and political ability, then we will be forced to look carefully at
our  domestic  policy  options,  and large  and  powerful  groups  are  not
going to like what they see.
One  option  is  to return  to  a  more  or  less  permanent  program  of
production  adjustment which shrinks  our agricultural  plant until world
market  growth resumes  and will  absorb  our products  at satisfactory
prices. This might appeal  to many farmers,  but they are not the  only
ones  who  will be  heard on these matters.  We now have  a huge agri-
business economy built around fully using our productive capacity and
large exports.  Those interests would be hurt badly by a return to the
old programs,  and they will resist mightily.  Moreover, that approach
to the problem will  help  entrench our  competitors'  position in world
markets.
A second approach is for us to lower the safety net of price supports
enough  to expand  sales  and  to  encourage  reduced  output both  here
and abroad. This is the direction which the current administration has
proposed, but it is not at all clear that the Congress will accept it at
this time. The one thing that is sure about this approach  is that it will
cause  some  pain  and  deflate  the  value  of some  agricultural  assets
along the way.
The only thing that  is absolutely  certain  is that the process  of ad-
justing to a different world than the one we assumed will be filled with
political  controversy  of the  type  we  have  not seen  since  the  1960s.
Even  though  it has not always  seemed  so,  the domestic  farm  policy
scene  has had relatively  little  controversy  for the last decade  and a
half. For the next several years those involved in farm policy will also
find themselves  involved  in issues  which will divide commodity  groups,
regions,  and political parties.
As the old Chinese  curse says, "May you live in interesting times."
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